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There is a pervasive tendency in organizational studies to view acts of 
communication in terms of the individual agent. It is the individual who speaks, 
writes, gestures, and so on; it is the individual we credit for effective speaking, 
just as it is the individualís ineffective listening that invites discredit. This 
tendency to focus on individual acts of expression is indeed unfortunate because it 
suppresses perhaps the central feature of such actions, their function within 
relationships. Indeed, as we shall soon make clear, it is from the relational matrix 
that the very possibility of individual sense making comes into being, and without 
the existence of ongoing relationship communicative acts lose their status as 
communication. As the editors of this Handbook have made clear, organizational 
worlds are created and sustained through discourse. This chapter makes it equally 
clear that it is through relational process that discourse acquires its significance. 
More broadly stated, it is by virtue of relational processes that organizations live 
or die. 
The Centrality of Dialogue: Early Intimations 
In this chapter we focus on the dialogic dimension of relational process in 
organizations. Although dialogue as a topic of study has been little mentioned in 
traditional handbooks of organizational study, its importance to organizational 
functioning has been subtly apparent since the inception of the science. Even the 
earliest research in organizational development attests to the importance of 
dialogue in organizational change. For example in Lewin's ( 195) groundbreaking 
research, the attempt was to enlist housewives in serving unfashionable meat 
products (e.g. beef hearts, kidneys) as a contribution to the war effort. 
Comparisons were made between groups exposed to persuasive information and 
groups that received the information and then discussed its implications. The 
results revealed that the discussion groups were far more likely to purchase the 
meats. In effect, "involved participation" in decision making was critical to 
change. Yet, while this study is often credited with spawning the field of action 
research, we actually know very little about the essential process of dialogue 
itself. 
Later studies continued in much the same vein. Classic research at Detroit Edison 
in 1948 aimed at improving work processes (Baumgartel, 1959). Again the 
researchers contrasted traditional training methods with group discussions. They 
conclude that "Intensive, group discussion. . . can be an effective tool for 
introducing positive change in a business organization." (p. 6). In their oft cited 
experiment, Coch and French (1953) experimented with organizational change in 
a clothing factory. In one group management informed a group of machine 
operators about changes in their job. In this group "resistance developed almost 
immediately after the change," resulting in grievances, quitting, and lowered 
productivity. In the experimental condition, groups discussed how working 
methods could be improved and how to eliminate unnecessary operations. In this 
case there were no signs of resistance. These early studies have stimulated a 
robust line of inquiry (see Porras and Robertson, 1991). And yet, because of the 
exclusive focus on outcome rather than process, we learn little about the actual 
process of dialogue. 
Organization of the Chapter 
In the present chapter the process of dialogue takes center stage. The discussion is 
composed of four parts. As a necessary precis we shall explore the myriad 
meanings of dialogue and develop what we view as a useful orienting platform: 
dialogue as discursive coordination. This orientation will enable us to consider the 
practical consequences of various forms of dialogic action. We then turn to the 
pivotal function of dialogue in the organizing process. We shall be especially 
concerned with developing a vocabulary of discursive action with practical 
consequences for effective organizing. After considering the uses of dialogue in 
creating organizaton, we turn to the problematic potentials of dialogue. A contrast 
between generative anddegenerative dialogue enables us to explore how certain 
forms of coordination ultimately lead to organizational demise. Indeed, the very 
forms of dialogue required for organizational well-being may also establish the 
grounds for deterioration. In the final section we turn to dialogic practices that 
may restore vitality to the organization. Here we focus on transformational 
dialogue, that is, dialogic practices designed to break through naturally occurring 
barriers to communication. 
Dialogue as Discursive Coordination 
In recent years scholars and practitioners have become increasingly excited about 
the potentials of dialogue for creating and transforming social worlds. However, 
such broad excitement is accompanied by a certain vagueness as to what is meant 
by dialogue. Choruses now sing hosannahs to dialogue, but seldom stop to 
consider that their praise may be directed toward entirely different practices. On a 
simple level, The American Heritage Dictionary offers the culturally common 
definition of dialogue as "conversation between two or more people." However, 
virtually no scholarly work on dialogue shares this definition; scholars of dialogue 
are not at all interested in mere conversation. Nor do such scholars typically share 
definitions with each other. In our view, the primary definitional criterion of most 
contemporary analyses of dialogue is derived from a vision of an ideal form of 
relationship; dialogue is defined in terms of the favored ideal. For most 
contemporary analysts, merely having a conversation does not constitute true 
dialogue. 
It is primarily the particular vision of the ideal that sets various dialogic scholars 
apart. David Bohm's (1996) popular book, On Dialogue, defines dialogue as a 
form of communication from which something new emerges; participants must 
evidence a "relaxed, non-judgmental curiosity, with the aim of seeing things as 
freshly and clearly as possible." (p. ix) Yet, Robert Grudin's On Dialogue is not so 
much interested in relationships that create novelty as he is in a ìreciprocal 
exchange of meaning...across a physical or mental space. (p. 11) In contrast, 
Putnam and Fairhurst (2001) are not centrally concerned with either generating 
novelty or exchanging meaning, but rather with the creation of convergence in 
views; they define dialogue as ìa mode of communication that builds mutuality 
through the awareness of others,(p. 116), and it does so through the ìuse of 
genuine or authentic discourse, and reliance on the unfolding interaction.(p. 116). 
At the same time, for L. C. Hawes (1999), the central ingredient of dialogue is 
conflict reduction; for him dialogue is "praxis for mediating competing and 
contradictory discourses." In further contrast, while many of the above scholars 
assume that dialogue is among equals, Eisenberg and Goodall (1993) are chiefly 
concerned with enhancing the voices of minorities. They see dialogue as 
"providing parties with a chance to speak and be heard and to challenge the 
traditional positioning of authority.. " Quite distinct from all these orientations, 
Isaacs (1993) defines dialogue as "a sustained collective inquiry into the 
processes, assumptions, and certainties that compose everyday experience." (p. 
25). Finally, for Tullio Maranhao (1990), it is not everyday life that dialogue 
should throw into question but all certainty of knowledge. For him dialogue is a 
logic of "stating and questioning," with the aim of generating the kind of 
skepticism that invites continuous inquiry. For Maranhao, dialogue is a form of 
"anti-epistemology." 
With such differing views of dialogue, each saturated as it is with values and 
visions, any general characterization of dialogue becomes perilous. In order to 
establish a more comprehensive analytic frame, while not sacrificing valuable 
distinctions embedded in these various accounts, it is useful to separate the 
normative from the descriptive. Rather than equating the term "dialogue" with any 
particular vision of ideal interchange, we offer an elemental descriptive definition. 
Variations in the specific patterning of interchange may thus reflect the various 
ideal forms sought by differing scholars. In this way we return again to an 
elemental formulation, but leave room for broad expansion in specific forms and 
functions. We do not propose a return to the view of "dialogue as conversation," 
as it does not serve our analytic ends here. The term "conversation" is both 
ambiguous and conceptually thin. Rather, for present purposes we propose to 
define dialogue as discursive coordination in the service of social ends. To 
amplify this view and its implications, we propose the following: 
1. Dialogue originates in the public sphere. In understanding dialogue 
many theorists have drawn from the individualist tradition in which 
language is a reflection or expression of the individual mind. On this 
account, dialogue is a form of inter-subjective connection or synchrony. 
The public actions are derivative of private meanings. In the present 
account we bracket the realm of subjectivity, and focus on the public 
coordination of discourse. This enables us to avoid a number of intractable 
philosophical problems (e.g. the relation of mind to body, the problem of 
"other minds," and the hermeneutic problem of accurate interpretation), 
and to focus on the relational function of various utterances within 
ongoing conversation. We are informed here, in part, by J.L. Austin's How 
to do things with words (1962), in which the performatory character of 
speech is illuminated. Utterances are essentially actions performed with 
social consequences. 
This orientation does not exclude psychological inquiry. However, it is to 
say that significant analyses of dialogue can ensue without recourse to 
psychological explanation. Effective analysis of dialogue need not refer to 
states of individual understanding, subjective biases or inattention, 
personality traits, and so on. This possibility was initially demonstrated in 
Garfinkel's (1963) groundbreaking work on ethnomethodology, and now 
more copiously in various forms of discourse and conversation analysis 
(Wetherell, Taylor & Yates, 2001a, 2001b). If psychological inquiry is to 
proceed, our orientation here is most congenial with Vygotsky's (1986) 
view that higher order psychological processes are reflections of social 
process. This is to say that the process of thought is essentially public 
discourse carried out on a private site. This is essentially the view adopted 
by Bruner (1990) in Acts of Meaning, and by Harre and Gillette (1994) in 
The Discursive Mind. In our view, however, it is most useful to focus on 
the forms of public coordination that originate, sustain, transform, and 
potentially terminate what participants take to be meaning. 
2. Dialogue is a form of coordinated action. In foregrounding the concept 
of collaboration we mean to call attention to the relational foundation of 
dialogue. That is, meaning within dialogue is an outcome not of individual 
action and reaction, but of what Shotter (1984) calls joint-action, or the 
coordinated actions of the participants. In this sense, the meaning of an 
individual's expression within a dialogue depends importantly on the 
response of his or her interlocutor - what has elsewhere been called "a 
supplement" (Gergen, 1994). No individual expression harbors meaning in 
itself. For example, what we might conventionally index as a "hostile 
remark" can be turned into "a joke" through a response of laughter; the 
"vision statement" of a superior can be refigured as "just more BS" 
through the shared smirk of the employees. 
In this context, Wittgenstein's (1963) metaphor of the language game is 
also useful. The metaphor calls attention specifically to the coordinated or 
rule-governed activities of the participants in generating meaning. The 
words, "strike" and "home run" acquire their meaning by virtue of the 
participation of the interlocutors in the rule constrained talk of baseball. 
Words invented by a single individual (a "private language" in 
Wittgenstein's terms) would not in themselves constitute meaningful 
entries into dialogue. In this sense, the traditional binary separating 
monologue and dialogue is misleading. The term monologue cannot refer 
to the language of one person along, for such a language would fail to 
communicate. The meaning of any utterance depends on its functioning 
within a relational matrix. Thus monologue is better understood as an 
extended (or dominating) entry of a single voice into a dialogue; in this 
sense monologue is an unevenly distributed dialogue. 
3. Dialogic efficacy is bodily and contextually embedded. While our 
orientation to dialogue emphasizes discourse, we do embrace linguistic 
reductionism. Spoken (or written) language may be focal in our analyses, 
but other than for analytic purposes, we do not wish to separate out such 
language from the remainder of the life sphere entering into the production 
of meaning. Clearly the efficacy of spoken words within dialogue is 
fastened to the simultaneous movements of the speakers' bodies, tone of 
voice, and physical proximity. Further, dialogic efficacy cannot ultimately 
be separated from the world of objects and spaces ñthe material context. 
The efficacy of one's words may importantly depend, for example, on 
whether one is clutching a gavel, a dagger, or a bouquet of flowers. In the 
same way, the meaning of words within the dialogue may depend on 
whether they are expressed in an executive suite, in a bar room, or over the 
internet. Again to draw from Wittgenstein (1963) the language games in 
which we engage are embedded within broader forms of life. Thus, the 
meaning of "strike" and "home run" do not only depend on the rules of 
baseball talk, but on their function within a form of life that includes balls, 
bats, bases, fields, players, umpires, hotdogs, and so on. 
4. Dialogic efficacy is historically and culturally situated. The contribution 
of any particular act of speech to dialogic coordination is contingent on its 
placement within a cultural context. In part this emphasis acknowledges 
Saussure's (1974) distinction between the synchronic and diachronic study 
of language. While we may effectively focus on contemporary forms of 
dialogue and their accomplishments (synchronic study), we must also be 
prepared for temporal transformations in what and how various ends are 
accomplished. For example, "the boss's orders" were once very effective 
within Western organizations, but they are slowly losing their power to 
generate activity. As concerns with workplace democracy, diversity, and 
organizational flattening become popular, an authoritative "top-down" 
voice may become dysfunctional (Yankolovich, 1999). 
Bakhtin (1981) also draws our attention to the heterogeneous cultural 
traditions that typically contribute to the shared language of a nation. This 
analysis prepares us for the possibility that partners in a dialogue may be 
polyvocal, capable of shifting from one mode or form of dialogue to 
another across the course of conversation (Hazen, 1993). At the same time, 
the focus on cultural heterogeneity prepares us for the difficulties that may 
be encountered when participants do not share discursive traditions. As the 
mounting literature on cross-cultural (mis)understanding makes clear (see 
for example, Rahim, 1994; Pearce, 1989; Ting-Toomey and Oetzel; 2001; 
Jandt, 2001) such dialogues may be frustrating and ineffectual. The 
dialogic moves effective for achieving goals within one tradition may be 
counterproductive in conversations with those outside the tradition. 
Similarly, even within the same culture the dialogic forms effective in one 
condition may not carry over to another. (See for example, Well's, 1999, 
discussion of optimal forms of classroom dialogue.) Whatever is said 
about dialogic efficacy within organizations must thus be tempered by 
consciousness of contingency. 
5. Dialogue may serve many different purposes, both positive and 
negative. Finally, by viewing dialogue as discursive coordination we 
attempt to avoid conflating normative and descriptive commitments. 
Coordination in itself is neither good nor evil. From our definitional 
framework, heated argument is as much a dialogue as an attempt to gain an 
appreciative understanding of another's "point of view." This is not to 
abandon concern with the kinds of ideals central to most contemporary 
analysts. Rather, it is to invite differentiation among forms of dialogue in 
terms of the ends they serve. Thus, while certain forms of dialogue may 
indeed succeed in reducing conflict, other moves in language may enable 
authority to be challenged, multiple opinions to be expressed, or taken-for-
granted realities to be deliberated. Drawing again from Wittgenstein 
(1963), "Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, 
a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails, and screws. - The function of 
words are as diverse as the functions of these objects" (6e). From this 
perspective, inquiry is invited into the specific forms of dialogue required 
to achieve particular goals of value. 
It is important to note here that the value placed on dialogic outcomes may 
vary significantly from one standpoint to another. For example, a vigorous 
argument, from an outsider's perspective, may seem aggressive and hostile. 
For the participants, however, such skirmishes can be enlivening fun, 
much like a game of chess. By the same token, the outcomes of any 
particular dialogue may be simultaneously both positive and negative (see 
also Thatchenkery & Upadhyaya, 1996). One may be pleased that a given 
dialogue succeeds in establishing intimate bonds with another, but 
simultaneously realize that certain critical capacities are simultaneously 
suspended. And too, what is accomplished in a dialogue may be judged 
differently in terms of what ensues at a later point in time. Many 
organizations have been disappointed by training exercises that generate 
immediate joy and communal good will, only to find that with Monday 
morning life returns to dull normal. 
Generative Dialogue and the Organizing Process 
If we understand dialogue as the process of relational coordination, it is 
immediately clear that certain forms of dialogue are essential to the process of 
building organizations. As people's words and actions become coordinated so do 
forms of life come into being ñ friendships, marriages, families, and organizations 
large and small (see also Weick, 1995, Yankelovich, 1999; and Taylor, 2000). In 
this sense, there is no inherent difference in the process by which two children 
create a sand castle, a family eats Sunday dinner together, a strike is planned, or 
the Ford motor company produces automobiles. Processes of dialogic 
coordination are at work in every instance. Yet, while we acknowledge the 
significant implications of understanding dialogue as relational coordination, we 
are still left without the kind of detailing essential for creating and sustaining an 
effective organization. Invited, in particular, is an account of those dialogic moves 
that facilitate the process of organizing. What moves contribute to what might be 
called generative dialogue, dialogue that brings into being a mutually satisfying 
and effective organization? 
A full treatment of generative dialogue would require an examination not only of 
bodily movements, gestures, and gaze, but of the environment and the objects 
available to people in relationships. A focus on historical conditions contributing 
to various forms of generative dialogue would be helpful, as well as an account of 
cultural variations in effective dialogue. However, given limited space and the 
emphasis of the present volume on discourse, let us focus in particular on spoken 
and written language in the contemporary Western organization. This is no 
insignificant matter, as language is the chief means by which such organizations 
come into being and are sustained. However, it is important to be sensitive to the 
limitations of such an analysis. 
Further, what we offer here may be viewed as a "first cut." That is, we work here 
without the benefit of a well grounded literature specific to the topic. We must 
piece together significant ideas from a number of disparate areas to offer a 
preliminary scaffolding. At the same time, we hope that this unfinished structure 
will enable more detailed elaboration as future study moves in this direction. 
It should be noted that we are guided in our present treatment by a social 
constructionist orientation (Gergen, 1994, 1999). In effect we place a strong 
emphasis on the way in which discourse functions to structure both a sense of the 
real and the valuable within relationships. From the relational matrix, then, both 
ontology and ethics ñ agreement on what is, and what ought to be ñ can grow. 
And, as these agreements are cemented to action, local traditions (sub-cultures) 
emerge. In terms of generative dialogue, then, the central focus is on those kinds 
of dialogic moves that may bring realities and ethics into being and bind them to 
particular patterns of action. With above provisos notwithstanding, we propose the 
following as central components in generative dialogue: 
The Pivotal Act of Affirmation 
As proposed above, because meaning is born in relationship, an individual's lone 
utterance contains no meaning. Rather, it provides the potential for meaning, a 
potential that can only be realized through another's supplement. The supplement 
of affirmation may stand as the key building block to creating conjoint realities. 
To affirm is to ratify the significance of an utterance as a meaningful act. It is to 
locate something within an expression that is valuable, to which one can agree, or 
render support. Merely responding to the question, "How are you?" with "Fine, 
thank you," is to render the question meaningful as a ritual of greeting. To respond 
with a blank stare would be to negate its significance as communication. In the act 
of affirmation elements of the initial utterance are also sanctioned as "real" and are 
given rudimentary value. The response of "Fine, thank you," simultaneously 
grants "personal health" an existence in the world and places value upon it. 
Affirmation is important for other reasons as well, partly deriving from the 
individualist tradition and the presumption that thoughts and feelings are 
individual possessions. As we say, "It is my experience that...," or "These are my 
beliefs." To affirm such utterances is to grant worth to, or to honor the validity of 
the other's subjectivity; failure to affirm places the identity of the other in 
question. Finally, in affirming an utterance one also sanctions the relationships 
from which it derives. If one dismisses a speaker's opinions, it is often to 
disparage the range of relations in which this opinion is embedded. To embrace a 
novel idea is to embrace new relationships, and to possibly to threaten old ones. 
Affirmation may take many forms depending on conversation and context. At the 
simplest level, careful or sympathetic attention provides a beginning. Curiosity or 
question asking also serves as a simple form of affirmation, as it grants to the 
speaker's preceding utterance meaningful significance. To "be moved" by 
another's expressions is a high form of affirmation. In her volume, Conversation, 
Language, and Possibilities, Harlene Anderson (1997) speaks for many change 
agents when she proposes that therapy becomes effective when, "the therapist 
enters the therapy domain with a genuine posture and manner characterized by an 
openness to another personís ideological base his or her reality, beliefs, and 
experiences. This listening posture and manner involve showing respect for, 
having humility toward, and believing that what a client has to say is worth 
hearing." (p. 12) More broadly, affirmation may be roughly equated with what 
many researchers call "mutuality" in dialogue (Markova, Graumann, and Foppa, 
1995), and finds parallels in mother-child interaction as well as relations with non-
human species. It should finally be noted that we are not proposing here that 
generative dialogue requires full agreement among interlocutors. Affirmation is 
not assent, a point to which we shall return momentarily. 
Productive Difference 
While affirmation is of critical significance in building organization, it is 
important to draw a distinction between affirmation and duplication. At the most 
rudimentary level affirmation ratifies the reality and value of a preceding 
utterance. However, it functions in this way primarily against the backdrop of a 
contrasting possibility, or domain that is negated. If another agrees with you, this 
agreement serves as an affirmation primarily when the other is apprised of what is 
not being affirmed or valued. When one shows signs of deliberating the issues, 
and then agrees, affirmation is achieved. If one is prepared to agree no matter 
what is proposed, we have duplication as opposed to affirmation. 
The distinction is important in virtue of a more general theoretical point: The 
conjoint creation of meaning depends on the generation of difference. In the same 
sense that the meaning of a single word depends on its differing from other words 
(e.g. bit, bat, but), so does the meaning of any utterance in a dialogue acquire its 
meaning from its difference from other utterances. To echo each utterance spoken 
by the other is to destroy the meaning of these expressions. Thus, in a more 
general sense, generative dialogue depends on the continuous generation of 
differences. The meaning making process is rendered robust by virtue of 
distinctive voices (See also Hazen, 1993). 
With this said, however, a further distinction is essential between productive as 
opposed to destructive difference. Dialogic entries that sustain or extend the 
potentials of a preceding utterance may be viewed as productive; utterances that 
curtail or negate what has preceded are destructive. They essentially impede the 
process of constructing a mutually viable reality. For example, to offer an example 
of what has just been said, to add an associated idea, or to ask about how an 
utterance might apply in a particular situation will typically function in a 
productive way. Adding new voices to the conversation may also make a robust 
contribution to productive difference. See also Barbules (1993) on ìbuilding 
statements.î}. In contrast, to announce that another's utterance is "just plain 
wrong," unintelligible, or outrageous will typically bring dialogue to a halt. This is 
not at all to say that disagreement is essentially destructive. There are 
conversational conditions under which argument and mutual critique are both 
anticipated and welcomed (see Billig, 1987). A properly conducted debate, for 
example, may vitally extend the range of relevant considerations for effective 
decision making. 
The Creation of Coherence 
The combination of affirmation and difference makes a potent contribution to the 
emerging world of the real and the good. However, in the same way that the 
meaning derived from a paragraph in a novel is highly dependent on its 
relationship to preceding paragraphs, so does meaning in dialogue depend on what 
precedes any particular turn-taking segment. To create a sustainable world thus 
requires dialogic acts that engender what is commonly termed conversational 
coherence (Craig and Tracy, 1983; Duck, 2002). Such acts enable preceding 
expressions to create a singular, ordered world about which to organize. Among 
the common dialogic inputs contributing to coherence are repeating 
conversational topics (topoi), offering comments relevant to a recognized issue, 
and providing answers to preceding questions (Barbules, 1993; Wells, 1999).. On 
a more subtle level, we wish to call attention to metonymic reflection. as a means 
of generating coherence. Metonymy refers to the use of a fragment to stand for a 
whole to which it is related. Thus, "the golden arches" are used to signify the 
McDonald's restaurants, or the British flag (the so-called Union Jack) to indicate 
the United Kingdom. In the present case, metonymic reflection occurs when one's 
actions contain some fragment of the other's actions, a piece that represents the 
whole. If an interlocutor expresses doubts about a given policy, and her colleague 
responds by asking, "What's the weather report for tomorrow?" the expression of 
doubt fails to be represented in the reply. The reply fails to include some element 
of the initial utterance. If a response includes a metonymic fragment of what has 
just been said, then the interlocutor finds him or herself carried in the other. 
Collaborative coherence is achieved. 
Narrative and Temporal Integration 
As dialogue develops it leaves in its wake a repository of discourse and associated 
action. This repository may serve as both a resource for sustaining generativity 
and a potential threat to continuation. Its major contribution to the process of 
organizing stems from its integrative properties. That is, as interlocutors set about 
constructing a world of the real and the good, materials are required for 
solidification. This world must become compelling, reliable and significant. One 
major means of solidifying this world is through integrating materials from the 
past - accounts of events that can fortify the present, fill out its contours, add to its 
dimension, and/or ratify its value. Although all past events can be used in this 
way, the most important resources for such solidification come from events 
common to the interlocutors themselves. By inserting accounts of the past into 
ongoing dialogues, the interlocutors also create a reality with historical depth 
(Thatchenkery & Upadhyaya, 1996). They cease to speak in terms of "what we are 
presently creating," but see the present as rooted in the past. The shaky quality of 
"here and now" is replaced by the concept of "tradition." Evanescence gives way 
to a sense of temporal lodgement. For additional insights into the ways in which 
narratives serve as organizing devices see Boje, 1991; Cszarniawska, 1997; 
Gabriel, 1995; Boje, 2001). 
Expanding the Arena of Generative Dialogue 
These four insertions into dialogue - emphasizing affirmation, productive 
difference, coherence, and temporal integration - may be viewed as central to 
creating the forms of reality and value necessary for effective organization. At the 
same time, these are only entry markers in a scholarly effort of extended duration 
and scope. For purposes of inviting collaborative expansion, we share here several 
additional contributions of significance: 
Repetitive Sequences. Generative dialogue may be compared to the fluid and 
synchronized movements of dancers. A key to the success of the dance is a history 
of practice. Yet, this is not the practice of isolated individuals, but of the 
collaborative unit. Their practice together readies each of them for the movements 
of the other. The slight pressure of the male's hand may send his partner into a 
swirl, at the end of which his open arms are prepared to receive her return. And so 
it is in the case of generative dialogue. If effective organization is to be achieved 
so must there be repetitive scenarios of relationship, sequences of action that form 
a reliable core. This is not to propose that all relational sequences should move in 
the repetitive direction. The result would be a stagnation of meaning and the loss 
of flexibility. However, without major contributions to repetition, organizational 
efficacy will be lost. A significant degree of dialogic ritual is essential. 
Reflexive Punctuation. As dialogues unfold and repetition becomes more 
frequent, agreements will emerge as to what is real and good. However, because 
the meaning of what has been achieved is inherently ambiguous - subject to 
alteration as the conversation moves on - effective organization may require 
periodic reflection on what has been accomplished. Such punctuating insinuations 
into dialogue serve to collect and organize the sedimented realities and aspirations 
of the participants. Comments concerning "what we have agreed to" "our 
objectives," or "our current plans," may all have this solidifying effect. Metaphors 
may play an especially important role in this case, as they have the capacity to tie 
together many disparate facets of conversation and action into a coherent whole. 
See also Weick (1995) on significance of "retrospective sensemaking. 
Constructing Bonds and Boundaries. Participants in an organization will often 
speak in the singular: "my opinion.." "what I think..." "my hopes in this case..." In 
effect, such dialogic inputs construct the reality of isolated individuals. If fully 
sustained, such dialogue may invite division, alienation, and destructive 
competition. Favored for generative dialogue, then, is a shift from a discourse of 
individual entities to a collective "we." In speaking of "our opinion," "what we 
think" "our hopes," the "imagined community" becomes a reality (Anderson, 
1997). The result will be a bonding among the participants, the creation of an 
exterior to the organization, and an increased focus on the relations among 
participants. 
In closing this discussion it is important to note that none of the discursive moves 
outlined here achieves its function until affirmed by one's interlocutors. While 
linguistic tradition forces us to single out specific "moves," "utterances," or 
"speech acts," this tradition simultaneously obscures the conjoint creation of their 
meaning as moves, utterances or speech acts. Thus, for example, a narrative is not 
a narrative until another ratifies it as such. One may tell what conventionally 
counts as "a story of a past success," but its reality as such depends on the 
affirmation of the listener. If the listener indexes the offering as a "manipulative 
ploy," or "a misleading distortion" the "story of past success" is destroyed. In this 
sense, the analysis of dialogue is not congenial with strategic views of 
communication competence. The success of a given move does not depend on the 
rational calculus of the actor, but on its relationship to what that which has 
preceded and follows. 
Dialogue and Organizational Dysfunction 
While dialogic process is critical to the achievement of organization it is also clear 
that not all forms of dialogue function in this way. The preceding discussion has 
attempted to pinpoint dialogic contributions that seem pivotal to organizing 
around a shared reality. Here we turn to the problem of organizational 
dysfunction. First, we inquire in a more general into what forms of dialogue 
undermine or destroy organizations. Then we turn to the more subtle and ironic 
ways in which organizing processes themselves lay the groundwork for 
disorganization. 
We shall not belabor the topic of dialogic dysfunction. In part this is because 
organizational failure is implied by the absence or inverse of the various dialogic 
moves just outlined. The failure to affirm, for example, can lead to within a 
relationship; failing to create coherence can undermine concerted action. Further, 
most of us well understand the destructive forms of dialogue by virtue of our 
participation in the rituals of everyday life. Common experience is perhaps our 
best teacher. However, two contributions to dysfunctional dialogue should be 
singled out for their ubiquitous deployment: 
Negation. Echoing our discussion of destructive difference, the negative move 
within a dialogue is one that essentially destroys the meaning making potential of 
a preceding utterance. This is not simply a failure to affirm, but the active 
obliteration of the utterance as a candidate for meaning. On a subtle level, active 
inattention serves as negation. Turning away from an interlocutor, reading a 
document, starting another conversation, or interrupting without acknowledging 
what has been said all serve as forms of negation. More blatantly, hostile critique 
or volatile arguments against the interlocutor's utterances can function as negation. 
Again, this is not to imply that critique and argument are always dysfunctional. As 
indicated above, much depends on the form (including tone of voice and bodily 
posture). However, it is to say that the latter forms of discourse must be employed 
with care and sensitivity. As suggested earlier, in the Western tradition one's 
words are virtually expressions of personal essence. To attack another's views is 
not, then, a mere linguistic exercise; it is to invalidate the originary essence of the 
self. 
On a more subtle level, monologic discourse may function as negation. As 
previously proposed, we view monologue as an unevenly distributed form of 
dialogue. If extended indefinitely it eliminates the space for the other's 
supplementation. In effect, the speaker preempts the affirmation process, placing 
the affirmation into the mouth of the otherwise mute listener. In this way, 
monologue subtly denies the listener participation in the creation of meaning. 
There is no recognition of a worthy essence within the other. Here we are 
sensitized as well to the relationship between dialogic forms and organizational 
structure. Monologic communication is traditionally a prerogative of rank. Indeed 
the presumption remains in Western culture that the more senior the individual in 
the organization the more knowledge he or she should possess. In this sense, the 
failure to display monologic prowess may be viewed as a sign of weakness. 
However, monologic speech remains effective only so long as the senior 
commands the kind of respect necessary for the presumption of affirmation to find 
assent. In the wave of recent support for workplace democracy and diversity 
initiatives, such a presumption becomes questionable. Further, as organizations 
grow more complex and confront an increasingly chaotic world of meaning, 
monologic discourse seems increasingly counterproductive (Anderson, et al., 
2002). 
Individual Blame. From the Western ideology of "the individual self," also 
sprouts the concept of individual responsibility. If individual minds are originary 
sources of action, then we may sensibly hold the individual responsible for his or 
her deeds - both good and bad. Such assumptions make their way into our 
institutions of law, into the application of rule systems within organizations, and 
into the rituals of daily life. In all cases, there is longstanding legitimation for 
blaming the individual for his or her untoward actions. Yet, in significant respects 
acts of individual blame function much like negations. They symbolically assault 
what is taken to be the center core of self. Resistance is thus invited, a resistance 
that is further exacerbated by the typical sense of righteousness. From the present 
standpoint individuals function within shared visions of the real and the good; 
there is no place in such worlds for "choosing evil." Such actions would be 
incomprehensible. From the personal standpoint, then, all actions are justified - 
"right at the time." Acts of blame, then, often seem unjustified, gratuitous, and 
alien to those who are accused.. In terms of dialogue, the challenge is to locate 
alternative conversational entries that may serve sanctioning purposes without 
resorting to acts of blame (see McNamee and Gergen, 1999). 
Organization as Disorganization 
Negation and individual blame may seriously impede the process of generative 
dialogue. However, there is a more subtle and ironic narrative of disorganization 
that requires special attention. To be succinct, we propose that successful 
organizing establishes the grounds for disorganization. To elaborate, consider 
Bakhtin's (1981) important distinction between dialogue that functions 
centripetally (bringing language into a centralized form of organization), as 
opposed to centrifugally (disrupting or disorganizing centralized forms of 
understanding). In this sense what we have characterized as generative dialogue 
essentially functions centripetally to create effective organization. However, 
dialogue that brings organizational participants together into a shared space of 
understanding, also functions in such a way that the dialogic traditions in which 
they are otherwise engaged are disrupted, suppressed, or in a word, disordered. 
Essentially the participants may come to embrace a particular reality, set of 
values, and practices that cut them away from other forms of life. The tendency is 
to become a "company man," "a bureaucrat," "a true believer," or ìone 
dimensional.îThe result is a subtle negation of that which lies outside the shining 
sphere of organization. The centripital process simultaneously functions 
centrifugally. (Also see Baxter and Montgomery, 1996, on dialectic change as 
inherent in dialogue.) 
This problem is exacerbated by a small group pattern long familiar to the social 
sciences, namely that of "in-group/out-group" formation. From the early work of 
Sherif (1966) to more recent accounts of group identity (Tajfel, 1981; Turner, 
1991), researchers have noted a strong tendency for organized groups to become 
alienated from or hostile to those outside the group. In-group members come to 
celebrate their way of doing things, their ideals, and their members; other groups 
form a devalued exterior. They are discredited and suspicious. In more 
contemporary terms, Foucault's (1980) views of power/knowledge are apposite. 
As groups develop a shared vision of the real and the good, they tend to 
incorporate or suppress alien discourses. The hegemonic thrust of discursive 
communities tends to marginalize or alienate those who fall outside. Or, in more 
practical terms, as organizations become larger, more complex, and more 
geographically extended, so will multiple discursive communities emerge, each 
with a particular construction of the world, each with a potential distrust or animus 
toward the others. Pockets of local organization - effective for carrying out the 
daily duties as understood within - carry with them potential resistances to other 
enclaves of meaning within the organization. The marketing division fails to 
appreciate the problems of Sales, Sales does not believe R&D is functioning 
effectively, the French subsidiary believes the home office in the U.S. is irrational, 
and so on. In sum, wherever dialogue is successful in organizing, there is a subtle 
undoing of organization, and unleashing of potentials for intergroup negation. 
Toward Transformative Dialogue 
In preceding sections we have focused on specific moves in dialogue that may 
contribute to both organization and disorganization. We turn finally to dialogic 
practices that may bridge the gap between alienated realities. Required here are 
moves in conversation that may sometimes differ substantially from those 
congenial to creating and sustaining a given reality, morality, or way of life. The 
challenge is that of bringing into productive synchrony groups that share solidified 
visions of the real and the good. We may speak, then, of transformative dialogue, 
a relational accomplishment that creates new spaces of meaning and enables the 
organization to restore its generative potentials (Gergen, McNamee, and Barrett, 
2001) . In what follows we will consider two forms of organized practice 
specifically focused on crossing boundaries. In each case we shall attempt to 
isolate those particular dialogic moves central to bringing about restorative 
change. 
The Public Conversations Project 
The Public Conversation Project, founded in 1989, seeks to create an alternative to 
polarized debate by creating constructive dialogues between parties (see Chasin 
and Herzig, 1994; Chasin, Herzig, Roth, Chasin, Becker, and Stains, 1996). 
Typically the group works with groups that have a history of marginalizing, 
demonizing and even eliminating the other. In some of their most important work, 
activists on both sides of the abortion debate were brought together in small 
groups for a 2-day meeting. The meeting began with a dinner in which 
participants were free to talk to another about any issue except the issue of 
abortion. The dinner gave way to guided conversations in which - during the 
subsequent days - participants specifically addressed the following questions: 
1. How did you get involved with this issue? What Ìs your personal 
relationship or personal history with it? 
2. We would like to hear a little more about your particular beliefs and 
perspectives about the issues surrounding abortion. What is at the heart of 
the matter for you? 
3. Many people we've talked to have told us that within their approach to this 
issue they find some gray areas, some dilemmas about their own beliefs or 
even some conflicts. Do you experience any pockets of uncertainty or 
lesser certainty, any concerns, value conflicts, or mixed feelings that you 
may have and wish to share? 
The first question enabled the participants to tell personal stories about events that 
shaped their views Often they shared experiences from their own lives or the 
experience of a family member at a crisis moment. The second question gave 
participants an opportunity to express their personal, core beliefs about the 
abortion issue. Finally, participants were able to speak of their uncertainties or 
ambivalence. Participants in this and other projects have been almost univcoal in 
their praises. Interestingly, in January 2001, six Boston women - public leaders 
from both sides of the abortion debate - revealed that they had been meeting in 
secret for six years after their participation in the project (Fowler et. al., 2001). 
Among other things the participants felt they learned to abandon polemical 
language; continued meeting enabled them to see "the dignity and goodness" of 
the those they opposed. While not eschewing their original positions, they 
reported that they "learned to avoid being over reactive and disparaging the other 
side and to focus instead on affirming (our) respective causes." 
What are the discursive moves that enabled the boundaries of animosity to be 
traversed? At the outset we find that the practice included certain generative 
moves in dialogue and avoided two more destructive possibilities. In the 
generative case, both the conversation at dinner and the session in which 
participants spoke of the "heart of the matter" for them, their "opponents" were 
cast in the role of respectful listening. The act of listening without responding with 
contentious questions subtly served an affirming function. At the same time, by 
steering the conversation away from uncompromising theoretical issues, few 
destructive differences entered the conversation. Finally, the dialogue was 
arranged in such a way that acts of blame were not permitted. However, the public 
conversations format also points to the importance of: 
Narrative Revelation. Listening to the first person narratives of those to whom 
one is otherwise opposed seems to have a powerful ameliorating effect. The 
reasons are several. First, such narratives are easily comprehensible; from our 
earliest years we are exposed to the narrative form common in personal 
storytelling, and we are more fully prepared to understand this form as opposed to 
abstract arguments. Further, stories can invite fuller audience engagement than 
does the explication of abstract ideas. In hearing stories we generate images, 
thrive on the drama, suffer and celebrate with the speaker. Finally, the personal 
story tends to generate acceptance as opposed to resistance. If it is ìyour story, 
your experience,î then the audience can scarcely say ìyou are wrong.î Narratives 
do not invite opposition but indulgence. 
Self Reflexivity. One unfortunate aspect of traditional conversation is that we are 
positioned as unified egos. That is, we are constructed as singular, coherent selves, 
not fragmented and multiple. To be incoherent is subject to ridicule; moral 
inconsistency is grounds for scorn. Thus, as we encounter people whose positions 
differ from ours, we tend to represent ourselves one dimensionally, ensuring that 
all our statements form a unified, seamless web. As a result, when we enter a 
relationship defined by our differences, commitment to unity will maintain our 
distance. And if the †integrity or validity of oneís coherent front is threatened by 
the other, we may move toward polarizing combat. In this respect the invitation to 
explore one's "gray areas" or doubts releases the demand for coherence. In Baxter 
and Montgomery's (1996) terms, we demonstrate one of the most important 
dialogic skills, namely the ìability to recognize multiple, simultaneously salient 
systems.î More broadly, self reflexivity may be only one member of a family of 
moves that will inject polyvocality into the dialogue. For example, in their conflict 
work, Pearce and Littlejohn(1997) often employ "third person listening,"in which 
one member of an antagonistic group may be asked to step out of the conversation 
and to observe the interchange. By moving from the first person position, in which 
one is representing a position, to a third person stance, one can observe the 
conflict with other criteria at hand (e.g. "Is this a productive form of interaction?" 
"What improvements might be made?"). 
Appreciative Inquiry 
Appreciative inquiry (AI) is a second and highly effective transformative practice. 
Developed by David Cooperrider and his colleagues in the 1980's (Cooperrider & 
Srivastva, 1987; Cooperrider, Sorensen, Whitney, & Yaeger, 2000; Fry, Barrett, 
Seiling, & Whitney, 2002; Ludema, Cooperrider, & Barrett, 2000) it is a method 
that aims to transform the capacity of human systems for positive change by 
deliberately focusing on positive experiences and hopeful futures. Traditional 
action research, they claim, has been constrained within a problem solving ethos 
and girded with a deficit orientation in which participants are encouraged to notice 
and talk about breakdowns and plan action around solutions that address these 
problems. AI claims that organizations are not problems to be solved but are 
"centers of infinite relational capacity, alive with infinite imagination, open, 
indeterminate, and ultimately - in terms of the future - a mystery." (Cooperrider 
and Barrett, 2002; p 236). 
AI practitioners begin with the belief that topic choice and question formation are 
the most important moves in shaping dialogue. Much effort is made toward 
creating questions around positive topics that guide attention toward peak 
experiences and strengths. The challenge is to ask questions that deliberately focus 
on those factors that contribute to the systemís operating at its very best. 
Questions are designed to encourage participants to search for stories that embody 
these affirmative topics. Participants are encouraged to develop an appreciative 
eye, to appreciate the possibility that every human system, no matter how 
dysfunctional or conflictual, has elements of beauty, goodness, and value. 
Although AI practices are frequently used to stimulate organizational change, they 
are particularly applicable to cases in which groups are locked in spirals of 
negation and vengeance. One case study in particular conveys the value of 
appreciative inquiry as a mode of creating transformative dialogue in a system 
under siege. (For a fuller description, see Barrett and Coopperrider, 1991). In the 
early 1980's, The Medic Inn, a one star hotel facility, was taken over by a larger 
enterprise and given the mandate to transform itself into a first class, four star 
facility. The parent company invested in the property and upgraded the physical 
facilities. However, the quality of service was slow to change. Managers were 
locked in cycles of interpersonal conflict and interdepartmental turf wars. 
Interpersonal tension and competition were seemingly insurmountable obstacles to 
overcome. It was clear to the consultants that the managers needed to engage in a 
different kind of dialogue in order to overcome conflict and move toward a new 
standard of excellence. 
The consultants in this case created a task force of managers to take a collective 
journey to Chicago's famous Tremont Hotel, one of the premier four star 
properties in the county. Here they interviewed managers about the factors they 
felt contributed to excellence. A typical question was: What were the peak 
moments in the life of the hotel --the times when people felt most energized, most 
committed, and most fulfilled in their involvement. Later, the participants 
interviewed one another about their own peak experiences in their hotel, and then 
began to articulate aspirations for their a possible future. In these discussions there 
were no traces of the cycles of blame and turf protection. The group returned to 
their hotel with a new cooperative spirit and a renewed capacity to generate 
consensus. They continued the dialogue that had begun with the appreciative 
inquiry at the Tremont and within a few months developed a collective strategic 
plan for excellence. Within a few years they had achieved a four star rating from 
the Michelen rating service. 
Appreciative inquiry seeds transformational dialogue in many ways. There is a 
premium placed on mutual affirmation; productive differences are encouraged, 
individual blame is avoided, and personal narratives create a strong sense of 
mutuality. At the same time, AI offers one highly significant addition to a 
vocabulary of transformative dialogue: 
The Co Creation of New Worlds. As outlined earlier, transformative dialogue is 
essentially aimed at facilitating the collaborative construction of new realities. 
Needed in the dialogue are what might be called imaginary moments in which 
participants join in developing visions of common good. These imaginary 
moments not only sow the seeds for constructing a common reality and vision of 
the good, but also shift the position of the participants from combative to 
cooperative. As participants move toward common purpose, so do they redefine 
the other, and lay the groundwork for a conception of "us." This is precisely what 
is achieved as AI participants engage in designing new futures. 
To be sure, the work of the Public Conversations Project and appreciative inquiry 
practitioners do not exhaust the possibilities for transformative dialogue. The 
interested reader is directed as well to the important work of the Public Dialogue 
Consortium (see Pearce and Pearce, 2001; Spano, 2001) on community change. 
Further, a rich reserve of resources may be located through several websites, 
including: www.uia.org/dialogue www.thataway.org/dialogue , and 
www.studycircles.org, www.un.org/Dialogue. 
In Conclusion 
In the 1987 edition of The Handbook of Organizational Communication, there is 
no index entry for "dialogue," nor does significant discussion of dialogue appear 
in any of the included chapters. We hope that the present chapter will signal a 
significant shift in attention, and serve as an animating springboard for new lines 
of inquiry. As we have attempted to demonstrate, dialogue is essential to the 
vitality of an organization, and neglect of dialogic practices can create internal 
schisms and ultimate collapse. In the present chapter we have developed a view of 
dialogue as discursive coordination, and within this framework moved on to 
consider dialogic practices that bring organization into being, that destroy 
organization, and that enable conflicting domains of meaning to be re-coordinated. 
Yet, these are only beginnings. We have already noted the lack of attention in this 
analysis to non-verbal forms of discursive action, to material context, to cultural 
and historical variations. However, a full treatment of dialogue should also be 
attentive to issues of power. Deetz (1992) warns us that the institutions of the 
ordinary - and particularly the relations of power - may preclude the kind of 
dialogue from which organizational change may ensue. In the same vein, we have 
not discussed the many possible relational configurations in which dialogue may 
take place. Various configurations of gender, age, kinship, friendship and the like 
might well reveal differing forms of effective dialogue (Duck, 2002.) Further, 
Myerson (1994 ) draws our attention to "double arguability," essentially a 
distinction between the interactions of the interlocutors in a dialogue and the 
specific issue at stake. Ultimately we must consider the relationship between what 
is said, the way in which it is said, and the form of relationship (Taylor, 1999). 
The present analysis has focused exclusively on the former domain, while 
neglecting potentially significant issues of dialogic content. Finally, our analysis 
has failed to make contact with issues of dialogic ethics. Should there be ethical 
imperatives for effective dialogue (see for example, Habermas, 1993; 
Krippendorff,1989; Baxter and Montgomery, 1996); are there ethical assumptions 
already implicit, or is it possible that ethical imperatives may interfere with the 
contextual necessities and generative potentials of dialogue? We favor, then, an 
infinite unfolding of the dialogue on dialogue. 
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